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The Council of Europe and the Creation of LGBT Identities through Language and Discourse: a 
Critical Analysis of Case Law and Institutional Practices 
 
 
Setting the Stage for the Analysis: the Council of Europe and the Protection of LGBT Rights 
 
This	article1	analyses	the	role	of	both	judicial	and	non-judicial	bodies	of	the	Council	of	Europe	
(CoE)	 in	 creating	 and	 circulating	 specific	 notions	 of	 lesbian,	 gay,	 bisexual	 and	 transgender	 (LGBT)	
identities	 in	 the	 European	human	 rights	 arena.	The	 article	 does	 so	by	proposing	a	 critical	 legal	 and	
queer	 analysis	 of	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 relating	 to	 sexual	 orientation	 on	which	 the	 European	Court	 of	
Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	has	ruled	in	the	last	three	decades.	This	analysis	is	coupled	by	an	ethnographic	
account	of	the	linguistic	practices	relating	to	LGBT	rights	of	Thomas	Hammarberg,	Commissioner	for	
Human	Rights	of	the	CoE	from	2006	to	2012.	The	article	argues	that	the	focus	on	specific	words	and	
expressions	rather	than	others	can	be	considered	as	an	attempt,	from	the	part	of	judicial	institutions,	
to	 give	 juridical	 legitimacy	 to	 a	 limited	 portion	 of	 forms	of	 sexual	 and	gender	 identities	 available	 to	
individuals.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 the	 work	 of	 former	 Commissioner	 Hammarberg	 seems	 to	
indicate	 that	 there	 are	 different	 linguistic	 and	 discursive	 practices	 that	 can	 be	 deployed	 by	 human	
rights	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	 escape	 essentialist,	 privatising	 and	 victimising	 language	 for	 LGBT	
persons.		
This	article	does	not	adopt	a	systematic	approach	to	the	analysis	of	the	entire	body	of	case	law	
of	the	ECtHR	in	relation	to	sexual	orientation	and	gender	identity.	It	may	be	argued,	however,	that	the	
chosen	 case	 law	 is	 analysed	 in	 a	 systematic	 fashion,	 insofar	 as	 the	 author	 has	 sought	 to	 analyse	
different	 facets	of	 the	process	of	 construction	of	LGBT	 identities	 in	 the	ECtHR	case	 law.	The	 chosen	
strands	of	case	law	object	of	this	critical	analysis	relate	to	three	specific	issues:	the	criminalisation	of	
consensual	 sexual	 activities	 between	 adults,	 the	 criminalisation	 of	 sadomasochistic	 activities	 (and	
group	 sex),	 as	well	 as	 the	 discrimination	 of	 lesbian,	 gay	 and	 bisexual	 persons	 in	 the	 armed	 forces.	
These	strands	of	case	law	have	been	identified	as	offering	interesting	insights	into	the	construction	of	
an	essentialised,	privatised,	victimised	and	respectable	‘homosexual’.	The	article,	however,	does	not	only	
focus	 on	 the	 casee	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 as	 it	 also	 discusses	 the	 juridical	 and	 non-juridical	 linguistic	
practices	at	the	CoE	concerning	sexual	orientation	and	gender	identity.	Within	the	European	context,	
the	CoE,	 and	 the	ECtHR	more	 specifically,	 have	played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	bringing	 to	 the	 forefront	 the	
rights	 of	 LGBT	 persons,	 as	 well	 as	 allowing	 them	 to	 become	 ‘sexual	 citizens’	 (Johnson	 2012)	 and	
‘respectable’	 legal	subjects	in	the	human	rights	arena.	This	phenomenon,	is	attuned	to	the	concept	of	
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‘homonormativity’,	 coined	by	Duggan	(2003,	50)	to	describe	a	type	of	politics	that,	on	 the	one	hand,	
supports	 extant	 institutions	 (such	as	marriage,	 the	 army	 and	 so	 forth)	 at	 the	 place	of	 displacing	or	
dismantling	them,	and	on	the	other	hand,	depoliticises	LGBT	identities.		
Whilst	greatly	contributing	to	the	enhancement,	visibility	and	protection	of	the	human	rights	of	
LGBT	 persons,	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 CoE	 have	 created	 homonormative	 –	 and	 transnormative	 –	 narratives	
about	 sexual	 orientation	 and	 gender	 identity.	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 depoliticisation	 of	 LGBT	 identities	
through	inclusion	 into	citizenry	and	access	to	human	rights	has	prominently	featured	in	 the	work	of	
several	authors	(Ammaturo	2014,	2015;	Ashford	2011;	Croce	2014;	Franke	2004;	Joshi	2012;	Stychin	
2003a	and	2003b;	Swennen	and	Croce,	2015).	This	article	is	in	continuity	with	this	strand	of	analysis,	
and	 seeks	 to	 understand	 the	 extent	 to	which	 human	 rights	 language	 can	play	 a	 creative	 role	 in	 the	
definition	 and	 of	 LGBT	 identities.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 article	 considers	 how	 language	 and	 discursive	
practices	can	also	be	dynamically	altered	within	human	rights	institutions,	in	order	to	better	reflect	the	
complexity	of	the	queer	and	LGBT	identitarian	spectrum.			
This	article	contains	four	sections.	In	the	first	part,	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
(ECHR)	and	its	main	principles	of	interpretation	are	presented.	This	is	combined	by	a	methodological	
assessment	of	Queer	Legal	Theory	and	Critical	Legal	Theory	as	devices	for	 interpretation	of	 juridical	
and	institutional	practices	at	the	Council	of	Europe.	In	the	section	containing	the	analysis	of	the	case	
law,	the	author	moves	onto	considering	the	way	in	which	homosexuality	has	been	constructed	 in	the	
case	 law	of	ECtHR,	particularly	through	the	categories	of	essentialism,	privatisation,	victimisation	and	
respectability.	 These	 categories	 constitute	 the	building	blocks	of	 a	 domesticated	 homosexual	 subject	
whose	characteristics	are	presented	as	being	immutable,	whose	desires	are	to	be	sheltered	from	the	
public	 gaze,	 who	 appears	 as	 a	 passive	 subject	 of	 rights	 rather	 than	 an	 active	 actor,	 and	 whose	
behaviours	do	not	overtly	offend	extant	public	(heteronormative)	morals.	The	third	part	compares	and	
contrasts	 the	 judicial	 discourse	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 on	 LGBT	 rights,	 with	 the	 independent	work	 on	 LGBT	
rights	by	the	former	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	of	the	CoE,	Thomas	Hammarberg,	with	a	specific	
focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 juridical	 and	 non-juridical	 language.	 This	 comparison	 shows	 a	 different	
understanding	and	use	of	 linguistic	choices	 in	order	to	construct	LGBT	juridical	subjects	and	human	
rights	holders	more	in	general.	The	fourth	part	summarises	the	findings	and	argues	for	a	scrutiny	of	
the	language	of	human	rights	used	to	adjudicate	and	protect	LGBT	rights.	This	enhanced	attention	to	
linguistic	 practices	 and	 discourse	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 existing	 disconnect	 between	 the	 theory	 and	
practice	of	human	rights.		
	
The European Convention on Human Rights: Principles, Interpretation and the Possibility for 
Critical Legal and Queer Analysis  
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 This	section	will	explain	the	role	of	various	interpretative	criteria	of	the	European	Convention	
on	Human	Rights	(ECHR)	deployed	by	ECtHR	 judges	when	adjudicating	a	case,	as	well	as	 looking	at	
how	the	case	law	can	be	analysed	from	both	a	critical	legal	and	a	queer	legal	perspective,	rather	than	
resorting	to	legal	positivism	(Hunt	1986,	4).	Over	the	decades,	the	ECtHR	has	played	a	central	role	as	
sounding	board	for	LGBT	rights	in	Europe	(Johnson	2012).	Lodging	a	successful	application	before	the	
ECtHR,	 however,	 is	 not	 easy.	 In	 2016	 alone,	 82%	 of	 applications2	 (38,502	 applications)	 were	
inadmissible	under	Article	35	ECHR.	Although	 in	 theory	every	person,	 citizen	or	 not	 of	 a	given	CoE	
member	state,	should	be	able	to	lodge	an	application	with	the	ECtHR,	the	process	is	quite	complex,	and	
legal	aid	may	be	sought	(Leach	2011).	In	this	regard,	third-parties,	whose	participation	is	regulated	by	
Article	37	ECHR,	are	acquiring	an	increasingly	important	role	in	litigation	before	the	ECtHR.	In	relation	
to	LGBT	applicants	before	the	ECtHR,	NGOs	have	often	played	an	important	part	(Johnson,	2016,	179).	
ILGA-Europe,	 the	 biggest	 umbrella	 organisation	 in	 Europe	 for	 LGBTI3	 rights,	 resorts	 to	 ‘strategic	
litigation’,	 in	 order	 to	 ‘us[e]	 a	 legal	 case	 to	 advance	 the	 rights	 of	 LGBTI	 people,	 usually	 as	 a	 part	 of	
advocacy	 campaign’4.	 The	 help	 of	 third-parties	 in	 drafting	 the	 application	 helps	 in	 maximising	 the	
persuasive	impact	of	the	claim.	It	is	also	important	to	point	out	that	advocates	(often	employed	in	the	
NGOs	 acting	 as	 third-parties)	 play	 a	 crucial,	 and	 sometimes	 proactive,	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	
complaints	 and	 the	 arguments	 brought	 forward.	 NeJaime	 (2003)	 has	 claimed	 that	 advocates	 can	
sometimes	privilege	the	general	cause	(for	instance	trying	to	obtain	freedom	to	marry	for	lesbian,	gay,	
and	 bisexual	 persons)	 at	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 specific	 client.	The	 danger,	 for	NeJaime	
(2003,	516)	is	that	advocates	end	up	constructing	the	identity	of	the	complainant	in	order	to	obtain	a	
legal	reform.		
	 Moreover,	 every	 judgement	 is	 a	 tripartite	 document.	 In	 it,	 the	 applicant	 makes	 the	 claims	
relating	to	the	violations	of	specific	articles	of	the	ECHR	carried	out	by	the	national	government,	the	
imputed	government	responds	to	these	claims,	and	the	ECtHR	operates	the	evaluation	and	assesses	the	
merits	of	the	case	after	having	carried	out	an	overview	of	the	national	legislation	on	the	instant	matter.	
This	structure	of	the	judgement,	however,	does	not	merely	replicate	the	submissions	of	the	parts,	but	it	
is	the	product	of	the	ECtHR’s	reconstruction	of	the	submissions.	In	this	regard,	the	absence	of	hearings,	
unless	special	circumstances	require	them	(Article	40	ECHR),	shows	how	the	judgement	is	the	written	
product	of	a	synthesis	that	the	ECtHR	carries	out	in	absence	of	a	true	‘trial’	in	the	Courtroom.		
In	adjudicating	the	cases,	the	ECtHR	employs	a	set	of	crucial	interpretative	criteria:	the	margin	
of	 appreciation,	 the	 consensus	 analysis,	 and	 the	 ‘living	 instrument’	 principle.	 In	 relation	 to	 these	
criteria,	Johnson	(2012,	69-70)	has	suggested	that	the	ECtHR	often	employs	them	without	consistency.	
The	principle	of	 the	margin	of	appreciation	has	 its	origin	 in	Handyside	v.	 the	United	Kingdom	 (1975)	
and	it	is	based	on	the	notion	that,	in	relation	to	particular	issues,	national	authorities	are	better	placed	
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to	evaluate	the	restrictive	measures	that	are	necessary	in	order	to	protect	and	ensure	the	respect	of	the	
rights	of	their	societies.	Hence,	in	some	cases,	states	are	entrusted	with	a	high	degree	of	autonomy	in	
assessing	whether	an	interference	by	national	authorities	pursued	a	legitimate	aim	and	whether	it	did	
it	 in	 a	 proportionate	 way.	 In	 relation	 to	 issues	 relating	 to	 homosexuality	 (O’Connell	 2009),	 this	
principle	 has	 had	 a	 determinant	 impact	 in	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 which	 has	 always	 proved	
extremely	cautious	in	overstepping	this	margin	of	manoeuvre	granted	to	member	states.		
The	 second	 important	 principle	 is	 the	 ‘consensus	 analysis’	 based	 on	 an	 often	 sketched	
overview	of	the	status	of	national	legislation	in	all	the	member	states	on	a	specific	matter.	As	Johnson	
(2012,	 77)	 has	 also	 reminded,	 the	 ‘consensus	 analysis’	 principle	 seems	 to	 lack	 methodological	
coherence,	often	resorting	to	either	incomplete	or	missing	data	(Johnson	2012,	80-81).	This	implies,	in	
turn,	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 may	 ground	 its	 reasoning	 more	 on	 perceptions	 or	 reconstructions	 of	 the	
consensus	on	a	specific	topic,	rather	than	on	legal	overviews	or	sociological	evidence	on	attitudes	and	
perceptions	in	the	societies	of	the	different	member	states.	
Thirdly,	 the	 ECtHR	 relies	 on	 the	 ‘evolutive	 principle’,	 also	 defined	 as	 the	 ‘living	 instrument	
principle’	(Tyrer	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1978).	This	principle	concerns	the	necessity,	for	the	ECtHR,	to	
interpret	the	ECHR	under	the	light	of	present-day	conditions,	which	is	to	say	as	an	instrument	that	is	
malleable	and	whose	principles	can	be	used	in	order	to	assess	human	rights	violations	in	the	present.	
This	principle,	 in	particular,	 represents	that	 ‘element	of	dynamism	and	development	that	constitutes	
the	essential	characteristic	of	the	European	system	of	protection	of	human	rights’	(De	Salvia	2006,	69).		
These	three	principles	provide	useful	guidance	in	order	 to	undertake	 the	analysis	of	the	case	
law.	 Furthermore,	 acknowledging	 these	 interpretative	 principles	 helps	 to	 better	 appreciate	 the	 role	
played	by	linguistic	choices	operated	by	the	ECtHR	in	the	deliverance	of	the	judgments.	As	has	already	
been	hinted	to,	 this	analysis	departs	from	legal	positivism	as	a	 ‘scientific	method’	of	studying	law	as	
being	inherently	objective,	legitimate	and	characterised	by	rationality	and	predictability	(Hunt	1986,	
4).	Whilst	firmly	grounded	in	the	conviction	that	the	ECtHR	has	been	a	fundamental	actor	in	ensuring	
crucial	 and	 enhanced	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 LGBTI	 persons	 in	 Europe,	 this	 analysis	 embraces	
critique	rather	than	criticism	of	the	work	of	the	CoE	on	LGBT	rights.	In	line	with	the	critical	legal	theory	
tradition	of	‘deconstruction’	of	the	case	 law,	this	analysis	seeks	to	highlight	the	political	nature	of	the	
law,	particularly	looking	at	how	legal	language	both	‘embod[ies]	and	implement[s]	power’	(Baron	and	
Epstein	 1982,	 673).	 For	 sociologists	 of	 human	 rights,	 who	 interrogate	 themselves	 on	 the	 socially	
constructed	 nature	 of	 human	 rights	 discourse	 (Bobbio	 1996,	 O’Byrne	 2016),	 this	 attention	 to	 the	
‘linguistic	turn’	in	the	analysis	of	human	rights	allows	to	engage	with	structures	of	power	underlying	
the	construction	of	specific	human	rights	narratives.	Ultimately,	 reflecting	on	the	 language	of	human	
rights	 can	 enhance	 its	 capacity	 of	 closely	 representing	 the	 subjects	 whose	 interests	 it	 purports	 to	
represent.	
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For	 this	 specific	 analysis,	 the	 underlying	 productive	 narrative	 relates	 to	 the	 essentialised,	
privatised,	 respectable	 and	 victimised	 ‘homosexual’.	 This	 particular	 Foucauldian	 focus	 on	 the	 active	
production	of	the	‘homosexual’	(juridical)	personnage,	calls	into	question	the	contribution	of	a	queer	
legal	approach	to	the	analysis	of	the	case	law.	 ‘Queer	legal	Theory’	has	been	conceived	as	a	synthesis	
between	the	normative	domain	and	the	open	network	of	extremely	diversified	queer	experiences.	On	
the	one	hand,	 it	 rejects	dominant	social	norms	regarding	sexuality,	 gender,	 intimacy	and	kinship.	On	
the	other	hand,	 it	 engages	with	 the	 legal	articulation	of	 these	same	predominant	norms	 (Romero	 in	
Fineman	et	al.	2009,	190).	Its	contribution	can	be	said	to	be	complementary	to	liberal	legal	positivistic	
analysis,	as	enables	to	go	beyond	the	 received	notion	relating	to	 the	determinacy	and	 immanence	of	
legal	language.	The	intention	here,	therefore,	is	not	that	of	‘trashing’	liberal	legalism	(Ward	1998,	156).	
Om	 the	 contrary,	 the	 objective	 is	 that	 of	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 ECtHR	has	 contributed	 to	 create	 and	
crystallise	 a	 specific	 vocabulary	 to	 describe	 the	 constellation	 of	 sexual	 and	 gendered	 identities	 of	
applicants,	their	lives,	as	well	as	their	attributes	as	human	rights	holders.		
	
Normalisation through Juridical Discourse: the Construction of “Homosexuality” within the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Discussions	on	the	theoretical	and	empirical	foundations	of	human	rights	have	been	central	in	
the	work	of	several	sociologists	of	human	rights	such	as	Turner	(1993),	Waters	(1996),	Bobbio	(1996)	
and	 Rorty	 (2011)	 to	 cite	 a	 few.	 Whilst	 expressing	 various	 degrees	 of	 scepticism	 regarding	 the	
usefulness	and	success	of	human	rights,	sociologists	acknowledge	the	role	of	human	rights	as	a	crucial	
political	 and	 social	 currency	 in	 contemporary	 global	 discourses	 on	 justice,	 equality	 and	 freedom.	
Notwithstanding	the	crucial	function	human	rights	fulfil,	a	critical	scrutiny	of	the	discursive	practices	
they	give	 rise	 to	 can	only	 contribute	 to	strengthen	 the	 level	and	quality	of	 protection	of	 individuals’	
rights,	 rather	 than	subtracting	 to	 the	positive	 role	 that	human	rights	may	have	 in	 the	 life	of	 specific	
groups	of	individuals	 such	as	LGBT	persons.	This	 is	because,	sometimes	laws	and	policies	 to	combat	
discrimination	 are	 often	 insufficient	 to	 protect	 individuals	 if	 these	 fail	 to	 address	 the	 removal	 of	
structural	inequalities	and/or	address	discrimination	from	an	intersectional	point	of	view.	In	relation	
to	 discrimination	 on	 grounds	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 and	 gender	 identity,	 the	 anti-discrimination	
rhetoric	may	be	said	to	only	marginally	tackle	the	problem,	as	Beger	(2004,	108)	has	argued:		
This	 quest	 for	 anti-discrimination	 is	 premised	 upon	 a	 particular	 understanding	 of	 society;	
namely	that	 it	contains	a	variety	of	diverse	minority-like	populations,	each	of	which	suffers	a	
kind	of	antiquated	prejudice	no	 longer	 tolerable	in	 liberal	democracies.	The	state	or	 the	pan-
European	institution	then	acts	as	a	neutral	protector,	facilitating	the	eradication	of	what	is	seen	
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to	 be	 individual	 aberrations	 through	 the	 passage	 and	 enforcement	 of	 anti-discrimination	
measures	(Beger	2004,	108).		
Here	Beger	(2004)	suggests	that,	in	exclusively	being	framed	as	‘victims	of	discrimination’,	individuals	
become	 embedded	 in	 crystallised	 power	 positions,	 and	 potentially	 dependent	 on	 the	 actions	 of	
institutions	for	their	safety	and	protection.	This	dilemma	reproduces,	to	some	extent,	the	classical	(and	
problematic)	 sociological	 distinction	 between	 the	 importance	 of	 social	 structure	 and	 the	 role	 of	
individual	agency.		
	
Decriminalisation	of	Consensual	Same-sex	Sexual	Practices	
	
	 The	 first	 (unsuccessful)	 complaints	 reached	 the	 European	Commission	 on	Human	Rights5	 of	
the	CoE	in	the	1950s	and	concerned	the	decriminalisation	of	same-sex	sexual	practices	between	two	
consenting	men.	 It	 was	 only	 with	Dudgeon	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (1981),	 however,	 that	 the	 ECtHR	
ascertained	for	the	first	time	a	violation	of	the	right	to	private	life	(Article	8	ECHR)	for	the	applicant,	a	
gay	 man	 residing	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 Together	 with	 the	 above-mentioned	 case,	 two	 other	 cases	
(Norris	v.	Ireland,	1988	and	Modinos	v.	Cyprus,	1993)	are	of	interest	for	this	analysis.	In	Dudgeon	v.	the	
United	Kingdom	 (1981),	 the	complainant	alleged	that	the	criminalisation	of	homosexual	acts	 (mostly	
unenforced	 in	practice)	 in	Northern	 Ireland	constituted	a	violation	of	his	rights	 to	 respect	of	private	
life.	He	also	alleged	a	breach	of	the	non-free-standing	article	14	ECHR,	insofar	as	the	above-mentioned	
legislation	 was	 discriminatory	 against	 men6	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 heterosexual	 individuals	 and	
homosexual	women	(who	were	not	criminalised	for	same-sex	sexual	activity).		
	 The	 warp	 and	 weft	 of	 the	 judgement	 are	 the	 terms	 privacy	 and	 morality.	 Weaving	 them	
together	without	contradictions,	however,	may	be	difficult.	The	ECtHR	reiterated	the	importance	of	the	
‘moral	 ethos	 of	 a	 society	 as	 a	 whole’	 (Dudgeon	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 1981:	 para	 49)	 in	 order	 to	
evaluate	the	existence	of	an	interference	in	the	enjoyment	of	Article	8	ECHR.	This	formulation	points	to	
the	idea	of	a	community,	to	a	common	and	shared	moral	compass	that	the	state	has	the	duty	to	protect	
and	preserve.	However,	the	ECHR	also	recognised	that	the	case	concerned	a	‘most	 intimate	aspect	of	
private	life’	(Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1981:	para.	52).	Hence,	if	the	‘moral	ethos’	pertains	to	the	
public	sphere,	can	it	invade	the	presumed	privacy	of	sexual	life?	The	ECtHR	ruled	out	that	this	 ‘moral	
ethos’	 could	 permeate	 the	 private	 sphere	 so	 deeply	 as	 to	 cause	 an	 interference	 in	 the	 sexual	 life	 of	
consenting	adults.	Whilst	ascertaining	a	violation	of	the	right	to	respect	of	private	life	under	Article	8	
ECHR	for	Mr.	Dudgeon,	however,	it	did	so	in	an	ambiguous	way:		
Decriminalisation	does	not	imply	approval	[my	emphasis],	and	a	fear	that	some	sectors	of	the	
population	might	 draw	misguided	 conclusions	 in	 this	 respect	 from	 reform	 of	 the	 legislation	
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does	 not	 afford	 a	 good	 ground	 for	 maintaining	 it	 in	 force	 with	 all	 its	 unjustifiable	 features	
(Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1981:	para.	61).		
This	 passage	 highlights	 the	 philosophy	 of	 tolerance	 (Dudgeon	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 1981:	 60)	
foregrounding	the	reasoning	of	the	ECtHR.	The	statement	‘decriminalisation	does	not	imply	approval’	
denotes	the	existence	of	a	moral	undertone	in	the	words	of	the	ECtHR	that	can	be	traced	back	to	both	
the	heteronormative	matrix	of	 the	nation-states,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	 triangular	 relationship	between	a	
‘guardian’	(the	ECtHR),	a	paternalistic	state,	and	individuals.		
	 Furthermore,	 the	 ECtHR	 had	 found	 that	 no	 violation	 of	 the	 anti-discrimination	 provision	
(Article	14	ECHR)	existed	in	this	case.	Judge	Matscher,	in	his	dissenting	opinion,	concurred	with	it,	but	
added	that	the	it	was	not	possible	to	ascertain	the	absence	of	a	breach	of	an	anti-discrimination	article	
in	 the	case	of	 the	 criminalisation	of	male	homosexuality,	neither	 in	relation	to	homosexuality	nor	 in	
relation	 to	 female	 homosexuality.	This	was	due	 to	 the	 ‘genuine	difference,	 of	 character	 as	well	 as	of	
degree,	between	the	moral	and	social	problems	raised	by	 the	two	 forms	of	homosexuality,	male	and	
female’	(Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1981:	para.	32).	Interestingly,	Judge	Matscher	had	not	defined	
those	 ‘social’	 and	 ‘moral’	 differences	 associated	 with	 male	 and	 female	 homosexuality,	 but	 had	 –	
implicitly	–	made	an	 association	between	male	homosexuality	 and	penetration	 and,	 by	 extension,	 to	
danger.	 This	 veiled	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘danger’,	 denotes	 the	 existence	 of	 hidden	 power	 relations	within	 the	
male	 world,	 where	 only	 male	 homosexuality	 has	 the	 potential	 of	 destabilising	 society	 and	 the	
homosexual	woman	is	invisible7	and	inoffensive.	This	example	highlights	the	essentialist	depiction	of	
the	 ‘homosexual	 man’	 as	 being	 entirely	 identified	 with	 his	 penetrative	 potential	 and	 his	 sexual	
behaviour.		
	 Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(1981)	presents	several	points	of	similarity	with	later	case	law,	
particularly	 with	 Norris	 v.	 Ireland	 (1988)	 and	Modinos	 v.	 Cyprus	 (1993).	 Firstly,	 in	 both	 Northern	
Ireland	 and	 Cyprus,	 there	 was	 non-enforced	 legislation8	 aimed	 at	 prohibiting	 male	 homosexuality.	
Secondly,	in	all	the	cases,	the	three	plaintiffs	were	activists	from	gay	organisations	whose	objective	was	
that	 of	 obtaining	 de-criminalisation	 of	 homosexuality,	 not	 just	 in	 practice	 but	 also	 in	 the	 context	 of	
criminal	law.		They	did	not	just	want	the	police	to	stop	harassing	them	both	in	private	and	public,	but	
were	also	calling	for	the	removal	of	criminal	sanctions	for	same-sex	consensual	sexual	contact	 in	the	
statute	 books.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 absence	 of	 application	 of	 criminal	 sanctions	 contributed	 to	 the	
creation	 of	 a	 situation	 of	 uncertainty	 that,	 as	 outlined	 by	 the	 plaintiffs,	 produced	 a	 prolonged	
interference	with	their	right	to	a	private	life.	This	aspect	can	be	configured	as	a	disciplinary	technique	
à	la	Foucault,	seeking	to	regiment	(homosexual)	bodies	whilst	threatening	them	with	the	possibility	of	
a	criminal	sanction.	In	the	three	above-mentioned	cases,	 the	plaintiffs	had	claimed	they	had	suffered	
from	marked	psychological	distress	(Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1981:	para.	37;	Norris	v.	Ireland,	
1988:	para.	10;	Modinos	v.	Cyprus,	1993:	para.	7),	recognised	by	the	ECtHR.	The	subtle	but	generalised	
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state	of	uncertainty	had	produced,	 in	fact,	a	situation	of	constant	vigilance	from	the	part	of	both	the	
individuals	and	the	state.		
	 Complementary	 to	 this	 aspect	 is	 the	 status	 of	 the	 applicant	 as	 human	 rights	 activists	 who	
ascribed	to	 themselves	 the	status	of	victims.	To	claim	the	status	of	victim	one	has	 to	have	suffered	a	
personal	injury	(Article	34	ECHR),	as	there	is	no	actio	popularis	available	under	the	ECHR,	At	the	same	
time,	 the	 plaintiffs	 used	 their	 activism	 	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 dismantle	 the	 (already	 weakened)	 national	
legislation	 on	 homosexual	 contact	 between	 adults.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 ECtHR	 judged	 the	
degree	of	severity	attained	by	the	State’s	behaviour	or	acts.	Privacy	proved	to	be	central	in	these	cases.	
Had	it	not	been	for	the	emphasis	on	the	fact	that	sexual	activity	was	an	‘intimate’	aspect	of	one’s	life,	no	
interference	would	have	been	detected	by	the	ECtHR.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	fact	 that	 the	 state	 could	
indicate	what	was	the	standard	for	proper	sexual	contact	between	consenting	adults	went	undetected.	
This	example	indicated	the	discretionary	criteria	employed	by	the	ECtHR	in	deciding	whether	states’	
actions	amount	to	a	violation	of	individuals’	fundamental	rights.	Dudgeon	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(1981)	
was	a	 landmark	decision,	with	positive	 reverberations	on	 legislation	 of	CoE	member	states	 that	 still	
criminalised	 some	 forms	 of	 consensual	 sexual	 activities	 between	 individuals	 of	 the	 same	 sex	
(Wintemute	 1995;	 Johnson	 2012).	 The	 judgement,	 however,	 did	 not	 dismiss	 the	 principle	 of	 a	
paternalistic	 and	 voyeuristic	 gaze	 of	 the	 state	 monitoring	 and	 evaluating	 the	 appropriateness	 of	
specific	sexual	behaviours	as	having	not	just	personal,	but	also	social	consequences.		
	
	 Sadomasochistic	Sexual	Practices	and	Group	Sex		
	
	 So	 far,	 the	analysis	has	considered	the	way	in	which	the	ECtHR,	 in	 its	early	 judgments	on	the	
decriminalisation	of	same-sex	sexual	conduct	carried	out	in	the	1980s,	has	predominantly	framed	the	
‘homosexual’	plaintiffs	as	being	an	essentialised	and	privatised	 socio-juridical	actor.	The	relegation	to	
this	 sketched	 depiction	 of	 homosexuality	 highlighted	 how	 the	 ECtHR	 condoned	 the	 way	 in	 which	
national	 states	were	willing	 to	 tolerate	 the	 ‘homosexual’	 subject	 as	 long	 as	HE	did	 not	 subvert	 the	
heteronormative	order	of	society	and/or	the	national	mores.	This	tendency	for	partially	upholding	the	
moralising	and	paternalistic	disciplinary	gaze	of	 the	nation-state	by	the	ECtHR,	 is	also	evident	in	the	
case	law	concerning	the	criminalisation	of	sadomasochistic	activities	and	group	sex	among	consenting	
adult	(‘homosexual’)	males.	The	judgments	object	of	the	matter	here	are	Laskey,	Jaggard	and	Brown	v.	
the	 United	 Kingdom9	 (1997)	 and	 A.D.T.	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (2000),	 concerning	 respectively	
sadomasochistic	 practices	 and	 group	 sex.	 As	 for	 the	 former	 case,	 the	 circumstances	 were	 of	 non-
specified	number	of	men	(out	of	forty-four	participants)	charged	by	British	national	authorities	with	
offences	including	assault	and	wounding	(Laskey,	Jaggard	and	Brown	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1997:	para.	
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8)	 for	 having	 committed	 sadomasochistic	 practices10	 filmed	 over	 a	 period	 of	 ten	 years.	 Applicants	
alleged	a	violation	of	their	right	to	private	life	(Article	8	ECHR)	rejected	by	the	ECtHR.	The	latter	case	
involved	 the	 seizure,	 by	 police	 officers,	 of	 video	 tapes	 at	 the	 applicant’s	 house	 that	 depicted	 him	
engaging	 in	 sexual	 intercourse	with	 up	 to	 four	 adult	men	 (A.D.T.	 v.	 the	United	 Kingdom,	 2000).	 The	
charge	against	 the	plaintiff	 had	been	 that	of	 ‘gross	 indecency’11.	The	 applicant	alleged	a	violation	of	
Article	 8	 ECHR	 and	 Article	 14	 ECHR	 in	 conjunction	with	 Article	 8	 ECHR	before	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	
applicant’s	complaint	was	successful.		
	 Commenting	 directly	 on	 the	 decision	 in	 Laskey,	 Jaggard	 and	 Brown	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	
(1997),	Califia	(2000,	144)	has	aptly	synthesised	the	relationship	between	the	ECtHR	and	the	different	
positions	occupied	by	(different)	‘homosexual’	complainants:		
Homosexuals	and	transsexuals	have	convinced	the	[ECtHR]	to	see	them	as	vulnerable	minority	
groups	 which	 need	 protection	 from	 a	 bigoted	 state.	 Sadomasochists	 are	 a	 long	 way	 from	
winning	a	similar	status,	partly	because	we	don’t	often	think	of	ourselves	that	way,	and	don’t	
represent	ourselves	as	such	in	front	of	the	general	public	(Califia	2000,	144)	.	
Califia’s	argument	here	can	be	seen	in	a	specular	fashion	to	Gayle	Rubin’s	(1998,	107)	famous	concept	
of	 the	 ‘hierarchical	 system	 of	 sexual	 value’,	 which	 postulates	 that,	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	 sexual	
activity	individuals	engage	in,	they	will	be	hierarchically	ranked	in	terms	of	their	political,	social,	moral,	
material	and	 legal	status.	 In	this	regard,	Rubin	(1998,	107)	argued	that	sadomasochists	were	among	
the	 ‘most	despised	sexual	 castes’,	whilst	reproductive	heterosexuals	ascended	to	the	 top	of	what	 she	
called	the	‘erotic	pyramid’	 (Rubin	1998,	107).	Here,	however,	it	 is	also	 important	to	note	 that,	whilst	
sadomasochists	can	be	both	heterosexual	and	homosexual,	it	is	nonetheless	true	that	sadomasochistic	
practices	and	identities	are	a	part,	albeit	minoritarian,	of	queer	politics.	Thus,	whilst	most	discussions	
on	the	 rights	of	 LGBT	persons	will	not	address	sadomasochistic	practices,	 it	is	 interesting	when	this	
highly	 stigmatised	set	of	sexual	practices	(and	associated	identities)	 intersects	with	the	 ‘homosexual’	
sexual	orientation	of	the	plaintiff	in	the	case	law	of	the	ECtHR.		
	 Back	to	Califia’s	argument,	it	is	possible	to	understand	the	failure	of	Laskey,	Jaggard	and	Brown	
v.	the	United	Kingdom.	Since	sadomasochists	refused	to	speak	about	themselves	as	victims,	the	ECtHR	
was	incapable	of	recognising	a	coherent	narrative	of	victimisation	leading	to	a	limitation	of	the	public	
interferences	of	state	authorities	on	health	and	moral	grounds.	The	refusal	to	be	seen	as	victims	entails	
a	symbolic	exit	from	that	negotiated	terrain	of	subjectivity	played	out	before	the	ECtHR.	Furthermore,	
since	 the	 ECtHR	 found	 legitimate	 the	 prosecution	 enacted	 by	 the	 member	 state	 under	 Article	 8(2)	
ECHR	 for	 protecting	 ‘health’	 (Laskey,	 Jaggard	 and	 Brown	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 1997:	 para.	 50),	
complainants	were	portrayed	as	perpetrators,	rather	than	victims.	Corollary	to	this	may	also	be	the	fact	
that	 the	ECtHR	may	have	been	 influenced	by	 the	 fact	that	one	of	 the	 plaintiffs,	Mr.	Laskey,	had	been	
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convicted	in	a	parallel	legal	proceeding	for	the	possession	of	an	indecent	photograph	of	a	child	(Laskey,	
Jaggard	and	Brown	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1997:	para.	11).		
	 The	 ECtHR	 approach	 to	 sadomasochistic	 activities	 in	 private	 differed	 from	 its	 approach	 to	
group	sex,	particularly	in	relation	to	issues	of	victimisation	and	privacy	of	the	individuals	involved.	In	
the	 case	 of	A.D.T	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (2000),	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 complainant	 was	 successful	 in	
ensuring	that	ECtHR	perceived	the	applicant	as	a	victim	of	the	state’s	interference	by	terms	of	Article	8	
ECHR.	The	ECtHR	emphasised	this	aspect	by	saying	that,	although	the	applicant	had	filmed	the	acts,	he	
was	worried	 for	his	anonymity	 (A.D.T.	 v.	 the	United	Kingdom,	 2000:	para.	 36).	Therefore,	 beyond	 the	
necessity	of	assessing	whether	group	sex	fell	within	common	moral	standards	of	the	member	state,	the	
ECtHR	 implicitly	 made	 an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 inoffensiveness	 of	 the	 complainant	 who	 engaged	 in	
activities	which	were	‘genuinely	private’	(A.D.T.	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	2000:	para.	37).	Here	reference	
can	 be	 made	 to	 Franke’s	 (2004,	 1410)	 commentary	 on	 how	 some	 ‘raunchy	 forms	 of	 sex’	 can	 be	
admitted	only	if	committed	within	the	context	of	marriage,	or	if	they	are	not	likely	to	become	known	in	
the	public	domain.		
A.D.T.	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(2000)	is	often	compared	in	legal	analysis	(Grigolo	2003;	Johnson	
2012)	to	Laskey,	Jaggard	and	Brown	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(1997).	This	is	predominantly	because	of	the	
different	margin	of	appreciation	(narrower	in	the	former,	wider	in	the	latter)	afforded	by	the	ECtHR	to	
the	nation	state,	but	also	because	the	applicant	had	made	clear	that	in	the	seized	videotapes	no	trace	of	
sadomasochistic	activity	was	recorded	(A.D.T.	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	2000:	para.	10).	This	contributes	
to	 suggest	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 may	 have	 considered	 sadomasochistic	 activities	 between	 ‘homosexual’	
individuals	 as	 ranking	 lower	 on	 the	 ‘erotic	 pyramid’	 (Rubin	 1998,	 107)	 than	 group	 sex	 between	
‘homosexual’	persons,	and	thus	needing	a	closer	scrutiny	from	the	part	of	the	UK	Government.		
	 Here,	however,	a	further	useful	layer	of	analysis	would	be	that	of	considering	the	occurrence	of	
an	 intersection	 between	 sadomasochistic	 identities	 and	 the	 sexual	 orientation	 of	 the	 plaintiffs	 in	
Laskey,	Jaggard	and	Brown	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(1997).	Over	the	years,	the	ECtHR	has	adjudicated	at	
least	three	cases	(K.A.	And	A.D.V.	v.	Belgium	2005,	Pay	v.	the	United	Kingdom	2008,	and	Mosley	v.	the	UK		
2011)	 concerning	 sadomasochistic	 activities	 by	 heterosexual	 individuals.	 For	 all	 the	 three	 cases,	
ECtHR’	decisions	have	been	consistently	negative	for	the	plaintiffs.		Whilst	the	ECtHR	only	marginally	
touched	on	lawfulness	of	consensual	sadomasochistic	activity	between	consenting	adults	in	Mosley	v.	
the	UK	(2011),	the	other	two	cases	(K.A.	and	A.D.V.	v.	Belgium	and	Pay	v.	the	UK)	show	that	the	ECtHR	
may	be	uncomfortable	with	 the	very	concept	of	appraising,	evaluating	and	adjudicating	on	so-called	
'non-traditional'	 sexualities.	 This	 is	 because,	 in	 both	 the	 above-mentioned	 cases,	 the	 ECtHR	 makes	
abundant	 references	 to	 issues	 of	 morality	 as	 being	 contrasted	 with	 the	 necessity	 of	 fostering	 a	
'tolerant'	and	'broad-minded'	society.	Sadomasochistic	practitioners,	 therefore,	be	them	heterosexual	
or	homosexual,	seem	to	be	subjected	to	a	similar	pattern	of	moralistic	gaze	from	the	part	of	the	judicial	
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body,	again	complying	with	the	enforcement	of	Rubin’s	(1998,	107)	concept	of	the	‘hierarchical	system	
of	sexual	value’.	
	
	 Discrimination	of	Gay	and	Lesbian	Personnel	in	the	Armed	Forces		
	
	 Questions	 relating	 to	 the	 essentialisation,	 privatisation	 and	 victimisation	 of	 the	 ‘homosexual’	
juridical	personage,	however,	would	not	be	complete	without	a	corollary	engagement	with	the	notion	
of	 ‘respectability’.	Discourses	on	the	‘respectability’	of	 the	homosexual	citizen	 feature	prominently	 in	
queer	scholarship	(Richardson	2005;	Warner	1993;	Joshi	2011)	and	relate	to	the	oscillating	pendulum	
between	 celebration	 and	 suppression	 of	 identity	 in	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 social	 movements	 identified	 by	
Bernstein	(1997).		Traditionally,	most	discussions	on	the	respectability	of	LGBT	persons	take	place	in	
relation	to	the	homonormative	character	of	same-sex	unions	and	the	'passing'	of	trans	persons	within	
a	 cisgender(ed)	 society.	 In	 the	 case	 law12	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 particularly	 in	 the	 judgements	 concerning	
same-sex	unions	(and	marriage),	as	well	as	the	parental	rights	of	LGB	persons,	the	ECtHR	has	clearly	
emphasised	the	character	of	 'normalcy'	of	same-sex	couples	(and	single	 individuals	wishing	to	adopt	
children)	 vis-a-vis	 the	 heterosexual	 counterparts	 (Ammaturo	 2014).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 confining	
discussions	on	the	'respectability'	of	LGB(T)	persons	solely	to	the	sphere	of	same-sex	unions	would	be	
reductive,	 as	 there	 are	 other	 strands	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 case	 law	 that	 show	 relevant	 patterns	 of	
'normalisation'	of	homosexuality.	As	has	been	already	pointed	out,	the	focus	of	this	analysis	remains	on	
the	 creation	 of	 the	 ‘homosexual’	 personnage	 beyond	 the	 context	 of	 homoaffective	 relations	 and,	
therefore,	 the	 case	 law	relating	 to	 same-sex	unions	and	marriage	and	parenting	 rights	has	been	 left	
out.	
When	it	comes	to	respectability	 in	relation	to	 the	‘homosexual’	individual,	 the	case	 law	of	the	
ECtHR	 concerning	 the	 dismissal	 of	 members	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 (all	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom)	 on	
grounds	of	their	homosexuality,	can	serve	as	a	good	illustration.		In	both	Lustig-Prean	and	Beckett	v.	the	
United	Kingdom	 (1999),	and	Smith	and	Grady	v.	 the	United	Kingdom	 (1999),	 all	 four	 applicants	were	
discharged	from	the	armed	forces	after	extensive	and	intrusive	investigations	carried	out	 in	order	to	
ascertain	the	their	sexual	orientation.	The	four	applicants	alleged	a	violation	of	Article	8	ECHR	and	of	
Article	8	 in	conjunction	with	Article	14	ECHR.	This	strand	of	case	 law	 is	 important	firstly	because	it	
weakened	the	widely	held	conviction	that	homosexuality	could	be	‘dangerous’	for	society	and	required	
‘containment’	 (Johnson	 2016,	 63).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 the	 case	 law	 also	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	
process	by	which,	in	the	military,	a	denial	of	homosexuality	was	enacted	by	means	of	the	construction	
of	a	paradoxical	‘homosexual	military	subject’13	(Cooper	in	Bell	and	Binnie	200,64).	This	process	had	
inevitably	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 patterns	 of	disavowal,	 secrecy,	 and	 shame	 in	 the	 applicants,	 and	
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more	 broadly,	 in	 other	 members	 of	 the	 armed	 forces.	 Ultimately,	 the	 case	 law	 on	 ‘homosexual’	
members	of	the	armed	forces	requires	a	consideration	between	the	fitness	of	the	‘homosexual’	person	
to	 represent	 and	 serve	 the	 nation,	 as	well	 as	 the	 role	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 as	 the	 access	 gate	 to	 the	
granting	of	 full	 citizenship	status	 for	 lesbian,	gay	and	bisexual	persons.	The	conclusions	 that	 can	be	
drawn	on	 the	development	of	 a	 concept	 of	 ‘respectability’	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	
ECtHR	on	LGB	persons	in	the	armed	forces,	is	undeniable	of	relatively		limited	reach.	At	the	same	time,	
it	 contributes	 to	 debates	 on	 the	 desire	 for	 inclusion	 into	 citizenry	 and	 crucial	 institutions	 (i.e.	 the	
army)	that	animates	mainstream	LGBT	activism.	
The	 two	 above-mentioned	 judgements	 present	 intersecting	 narrative	 lines.	 In	 their	
submissions14,	all	 the	parties	(the	applicants,	the	British	government,	and	the	ECtHR)	referred	to	the	
same	 ideas	of	excellence,	professionalism	and	security.	The	 invisible	 red	 thread	that	connects	 them	is	
the	notion	of	respectability	of	LGB	persons	as	members	of	the	military.	The	reason	for	the	discharge	of	
LGB	personnel	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	derived	from	the	1994	Guidelines	which	maintained	that	LGB	
personnel	‘damage	the	morale	and	unit	effectiveness’	(Lustig-Prean	and	Beckett	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	
1999:	 para.	 42),	 causing	 a	 breach	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 national	 security.	 In	 order	 to	 counter	 this	
argument,	all	four	applicants	in	the	two	different	cases	had	submitted	their	records	of	service	as	proof	
not	 just	 of	 their	 suitability,	 but	 of	 their	 excellence	 in	 their	 work.	 In	 its	 assessment	 of	 the	 alleged	
violation	of	the	right	to	private	life,	 the	ECtHR	reinstated	the	existence	of	such	an	excellent	record	of	
service	for	the	applicants	(Lustig-Prean	and	Beckett	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	1999:	para	85	and	Smith	and	
Grady	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 1999:	 para.	 95).	 This	 emphasis	 was	 undeniably	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	
ascertain	whether	the	sole	reason	for	the	applicants’	discharge	was	their	homosexuality.	At	the	same	
time,	 however,	 it	 led	 to	 an	 overstated	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 lesbian,	 gay,	 and	 bisexual	 individuals	 in	 the	
military	were	capable	of	serving	the	country	in	an	irreprehensible	way.		
Would	 have	 the	 plaintiffs’	 claims	 been	 equally	 strong,	 had	 their	 record	 of	 service	 been	
mediocre,	 rather	 than	 excellent?	 The	 logic	 of	 the	 ‘role	model’,	 by	which	 exceptional	 achievements	of	
[LGBT]	persons	are	highlighted	in	different	fields,	can	be	a	‘double-edged	sword’.	Firstly,	‘role	models’	
may	 either	 enhance	 or	 deflate	 personal	 self-esteem	 in	 different	 individuals	 (Lockwood	 and	 Kunda	
1997).	Additionally,	they	can	contribute	to	the	reinforcement	of	what	McGuigan	(2014)	has	called	the	
‘neoliberal	self ’.	In	conjunction	with	the	case	law	analysed	in	the	previous	sections	of	this	article,	these	
two	strands	of	judgements	lead	to	two	important	reflections.	Firstly,	it	can	be	noted	that	the	plaintiffs	
engage	in	a	dialectical	dialogue	with	the	ECtHR	in	which	they	seem	to	be	aware	of	the	fact	that	juridical	
language	requires	a	‘reduction’	of	the	real	experience	(and,	therefore,	a	banalisation	of	identities).	This	
can	otherwise	be	expressed,	in	the	words	of	Croce	(2014,	10)	as	a	process	whereby	LGBT	subjects	self-
surrender	 to	 a	 model	 that	 has	 oppressed	 them	 for	 centuries,	 a	 model	 characterised	 by	 a	 ‘juridical	
normalisation	of	homosexuality’.	Secondly,	the	judges	of	the	ECtHR	actively	participate	to	the	validation	
and	circulation	of	 ‘dominant’	arguments	on	respectable	LGBT	persons	by	means	of	a	rigorous	use	of	
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juridical	 language	 which	 appears	 to	 be	 autonomous	 and	 circular	 (Croce	 2014,	 12).	 In	 this	 regard,	
Johnson	 (2012,	 33)	 	 has	 gone	 as	 far	 as	 arguing	 that	 complainants	 to	 the	 ECtHR	 have	 substantially	
subscribed	 –	 if	 not	 encouraged	 in	 the	 first	 place	 –	 to	 the	 circulation	 of	 the	 essentialist	 view	 of	
homosexuality,	 leading	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 the	 humanness	 of	 the	 homosexual	
plaintiff	and	 the	humanness	of	 the	 subjects	 of	human	rights.	This	aspect	 raises	 important	questions	
concerning	the	‘authorship’	of	complainants,	a	question	that	has	been	recently	addressed	in	the	work	
of	Johnson	(2016).		
	
	
	
Beyond the Case Law: a Comparison between the ECtHR and the CoE Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Linguistic Choices to Describe Gender and Sexuality 
	
So	 far,	 the	 analysis	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 specific	 strands	 of	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 relating	 to	
sexual	orientation.	 In	order	to	broaden	the	discussion	on	 language	used	 in	human	rights	to	describe	
sexual	orientation	 [and	gender	 identity],	 however,	 it	 is	possible	 to	undertake	a	 comparison	between	
the	 linguistic	 practices	 of	 the	 juridical	 body	 of	 the	 CoE	 (the	 ECtHR)	 and	 its	 independent	 body	 (the	
Commissioner).	 The	 ECtHR,	 in	 fact,	 is	 not	 the	 only	 body	 at	 the	 CoE	 involved	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	
vocabulary	 concerning	 sexual	 orientation	 and	 gender	 identity.	 In	 2011,	 the	 then	 Commissioner	
Hammarberg	published	a	pioneering	report	on	homophobia	and	transphobia	 in	 the	47	CoE	member	
states	(Commissioner	2011).	During	the	editing	process,	in	Autumn	2010,	I	carried	out	a	four	months	
ethnography	at	the	office	of	the	Commissioner,	having	direct	insight	into	the	discussions	between	him	
and	his	team	in	relation	to	editorial	and	linguistic	choices	for	the	report.	Although	the	Commissioner	
consistently	adopts	a	different	language	concerning	sexual	orientation	and	gender	identity	from	that	of	
the	case	law	of	the	ECtHR,	by	adopting	a	more	inclusive	and	less	pathologising	descriptive	language,	he	
nonetheless	participates	to	the	process	of	normalisation	of	sexual	and	gender	identities	 in	the	socio-
juridical	sphere.			
Notwithstanding	 the	 attempts	 of	 freeing	 it	 from	 its	 original	 medical	 connotation,	 the	 word	
‘homosexual’	 retains	 a	pathologising	 aura	 (Donovan	1993,	 30).	 Yet,	 the	 term	 is	 still	 commonly	used	
and,	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 analysis,	 is	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 privileged	 term	 employed	 by	 the	 ECtHR	when	
referring	 to	 an	 individual	 with	 a	 specific	 sexual	 orientation	 (either	 ascribed	 or	 self-assumed).	 It	 is	
striking	that	the	since	the	first	complaints	were	lodged	before	the	ECtHR	in	the	1950s15,	the	vocabulary	
of	 the	 ECtHR	 relating	 to	 sexual	 orientation	 and/or	 gender	 identity	 has	 not	 been	 dramatically	
transformed.	At	the	same	time,	other	CoE	institutions	(the	Committee	of	Ministers,	the	Parliamentary	
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Assembly	 and	 the	 Commissioner),	 have	 also	 played	 a	 part	 in	 the	 advancement	 of	 LGBT	 rights	 in	
Europe.	 In	the	 last	 ten	years,	 in	particular,	 the	 independent	figure	of	 the	Commissioner,	has	acted	as	
strong	catalyst	for	the	streamlining	of	LGBT(I)	issues	at	the	CoE.	The	2011	report	on	homophobia	and	
transphobia	 in	 the	 CoE	 member	 states	 (Commissioner	 2011),	 represents	 a	 pivotal	 event	 in	 this	
direction.		Beyond	the	issues	of	the	breadth	of	contents	covered	in	the	report,	its	importance	lies	in	the	
linguistic	choices	adopted	by	Commissioner	Hammarberg	and	his	team.	In	its	preliminary	phase,	the	
process	of	editing	of	the	report	required	an	effort	 to	bring	linguistic	coherence	to	the	text.	The	team	
working	 on	 the	 report	 sought	 to	 carry	 out,	 in	 particular,	 a	 process	 of	 de-essentialisation	 of	
homosexuality,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 different	 understanding	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	 sexuality	 and	
personhood.	In	the	 few	instances	in	which	 the	term	had	been	retained	in	the	2011	Report,	the	word	
homosexual	was	used	as	 an	adjective,	 rather	 than	as	a	noun.	The	 same	applied	 to	 lesbian	 (a	 lesbian	
woman),	 as	 well	 as	 to	bisexual	 (a	 bisexual	 person	 /	man	 /	woman)	 or	 transgender	 and	 intersex	 (a	
transgender/	 intersex	 person)	 (Commissioner	 2011).	 Whilst	 the	 difference	 between	 homosexual	
(noun)	 and	 homosexual	 (adjective)	 may	 seem	 trivial,	 it	 has,	 instead,	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 the	
construction	of	 the	arguments:	homosexual	 as	 a	noun	 is	 self-sufficient	and	self-standing.	 In	 fact,	 the	
noun	can	be	used	to	promote	an	essentialist	vision	of	sexual	orientation.	Zwicky	(cited	in	Livia	and	Hall	
1997,	22)	attributed	the	preference	for	adjectives	rather	than	nouns	to	the	fact	that	nouns	reduce	the	
individual	 to	 that	 single	 property,	 while	 adjectives	 designate	 one	 characteristic	 out	 of	 many.	
Homosexual	(or	lesbian,	bisexual,	and	so	forth)	as	an	adjective,	therefore,	is	used	as	an	addition,	a	non-
essential	part	of	the	speech,	not	as	a	substitute	for	the	individual	himself.		
Another	 choice	 operated	 by	 the	 Commissioner	 beyond	 the	 issues	 of	 de-essentialisation,	 has	
been	the	decision	to	prefer	the	word	persons	rather	than	people	after	adjectives	such	as	LGBT	/	gay	/	
lesbian	/	bisexual	/	transgender	and	intersex.	The	persons	v.	people	issue	signals	an	important	move:	
from	a	collective	anonymous	and	unspecified	group	of	subjects,	to	an	empowering	depiction	of	active	
individual	agents.	Perfectly	fitted	with	the	demands	of	neoliberal	human	rights	rhetoric,	the	persons	v.	
people	issue	signals	here	the	need	to	move	from	an	essentialist	conception	of	sexual	orientation	and/or	
gender	 identity	 to	 a	 non-essentialist	 characterisation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 this	 process	
implicitly	 reduces	 the	 symbolic	 significance	 and	 powerfulness	 of	 a	 term	 that	 stands	 for	 collective	
empowerment	such	as	‘people’.	The	effects	of	these	 linguistic	choices	can	be	said	to	be	controversial,	
since	 they	 simultaneously	 de-materialise	 LGBT	 identities	 as	 collective	 and	 re-materialise	 them	 as	
individual	positions	with	relatively	weaker	communal	and	cultural	ties.	Here	a	critical	connection	can	
be	established	with	Marx’s	(1977)	polemical	argument	on	the	concept	of	individual	rights	as	the	rights	
of	the	‘selfish	man’.		
There	are	significant	differences	between	the	language	in	use	at	the	ECtHR	and	at	the	office	of	
the	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights.	 In	 the	 work	 of	 the	 latter,	 there	 has	 been	 almost	 a	 complete	
substitution	of	the	work	homosexual	with	the	word	gay	(although	always	used	as	an	adjective	as	in	gay	
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man).	 Zwicky	 (cited	 in	 Livia	 and	Hall	 2007,	 22)	 sums	 up	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 terms	 by	
pointing	 to	 the	behaviour	 v.	 identity	 dichotomy.	 In	 the	 case	 law	of	 the	 ECtHR,	where	 the	 judges	 use	
linguistic	 expressions	 such	as	 ‘consciously	 homosexual’	 (Dudgeon	v.	 the	United	Kingdom,	 1981),	 ‘the	
private	life	of	an	homosexual’	(Fretté	v.	France,	2002),	‘equality	of	the	rights	of	homosexuals’	(Karner	v.	
Austria,	 2003),	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 a	 taxonomical	 description	 of	 ‘the	 homosexual’	 akin	 to	 that	
described	 by	 Foucault.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 former	 Commissioner’s	 choice	 to	 use	 gay	 rather	 than	
homosexual,	seems	to	suggest	the	abandonment	of	such	taxonomic	approach.	Whilst	still	problematic,	
the	term	gay,	points	to	different	relations	with	other	fields	of	 life	rather	than	simply	sexual	desire	or	
behaviour.	More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 relationships	with	 the	 public	 sphere,	 to	
cultural	phenomena	and	understandings	and	appropriations	of	homosexuality	(Donovan	1993).	
Power	 relations	play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	choices	 adopted	by	different	 actors	 at	 the	CoE.	
Contrarily	 to	 the	 austere	 image	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 is	 that	 of	 a	 dynamic	
institution	 who	 crucially	 engages	 in	 dialogue	 with	 NGOs,	 as	well	 as	 national	 authorities	 and	 other	
stakeholders.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Commissioner	 has	 no	 interest	 in	 employing	 ‘scientific’	 (hence	
reliable,	neutral,	objective)	terms,	as	it	 is	the	case	for	the	case	law	of	 the	ECtHR.	For	 this	reason,	the	
linguistic	choice	of	the	term	gay	goes	in	the	direction	of	building	a	bridge	between	the	aseptic	version	
of	homosexuality	produced	by	 the	ECtHR,	and	the	kaleidoscope	of	 sexual	expression	experienced	by	
real	individuals.	Another	illustration	of	this	intention	is	the	use	of		acronym	‘LGBT’	is	widely	employed	
throughout	 the	2011	Report,	 including	 a	preliminary	 reference	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 including	 ‘Q’	 for	
queer	 and	 ‘I’	 for	 intersex.	 This	 choice	 signals	 a	 relative	 interest	 and	 familiarity,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
Commissioner,	with	the	world	of	human	rights	activism,	as	well	as	an	interest	 in	communicating	 the	
existence	and	worth	of	these	organised	networks	to	his	main	intended	audience:	national	authorities.	
The	language	adopted	by	the	 former	Commissioner,	 therefore,	 is	much	more	comprehensive	 that	the	
one	adopted	by	the	ECtHR.	
Furthermore,	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 linguistic	 choices	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	 former	
Commissioner	were	 not	 limited	 to	words	 concerning	 sexual	 orientation,	 as	 they	 also	 concerned	 the	
different	uses	of	the	terms	transgender/	transsexual	(as	either	adjectives	or	nouns).	While	the	former	is	
more	inclusive	in	terms	of	persons	who	can	fall	within	the	process	of	crossing	gender	(and	sex)	lines;	
the	 latter,	highly	medical	 connoted,	defines	a	much	narrower	group	of	 individuals	who	may	wish	 to	
undergo	or	have	undergone	some	form	of	gender	confirmation	surgery	in	order	to	 cross	 the	‘line’	of	
biological	 sex.	 It	 is	 worthy	 pointing	 out	 that	 some	 transsexual	 persons	 do	 not	 feel	 relatedness	 or	
belonging	with	the	transgender	community,	as	they	may	wish	to	‘pass’	in	the	sex	and	gender	that	the	
surger(ies)	 have	 helped	 to	 confirm	 (Roen	 2002,	 502).	 All	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 date	 has	
invariably	adopted	this	‘psychomedical	construction’	(Roen	2002,	502).	Even	in	Goodwin	v.	the	United	
Kingdom	(2002),	considered	by	many	a	landmark	case16	of	the	ECtHR’s	case	law	on	gender	identity,	the	
language	employed	is	heavily	connoted	in	medical	terms.	In	considering	the	‘applicant’s	situation	as	a	
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transsexual’	(Goodwin	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	2002:	para.	76),	the	ECtHR	reinstated	the	importance	of	
passing	and,	indirectly,	of	respectability.	This	is	in	accordance	to	what	Roen	(2002,	502)	has	defined	as	
being	 part	 of	 ‘liberal	 transsexual	 politics’.	 ‘Liberal	 transsexual	 politics’	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 dominant	
framework	 in	 human	 rights	 discourses,	 standing	 in	 opposition	 to	 forms	 of	 transgression	 and	
transcendence	that	could	be	defined	as	‘radical	politics	of	gender	transgression’	(Roen	2002,	502).	The	
ECtHR,	 therefore,	 by	 exclusively	 employing	 the	 word	 transsexual	 as	 a	 noun,	 promotes	 a	 strong	
objectification	of	individuals	who	cross	the	lines	of	sex	and/or	of	gender.	At	the	same	time,	of	course,	it	
is	necessary	to	also	acknowledge	that	most	cases	analysed	by	the	ECtHR,	concerned	individuals	who	
had	surgically	crossed	(or	wished	to)	the	line	of	biological	sex,	as	well	as	that	of	gender.	The	work	of	the	
former	Commissioner	on	issues	relating	to	gender	identity	seems	to	be	informed	by		a	non-essentialist,	
although	 cautious,	 approach	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 ECtHR.	 In	 the	 2011	 Report,	 the	
Commissioner	had	questioned	the	requirement	of	sterilisation	for	transgender	individuals	 in	place	in	
most	CoE	member	states	to	have	their	name	and/or	gender	legally	recognised.	In	the	Report,	however,	
the	Commissioner	did	not	advocate	for	a	substantial	abandonment	of	the	female/male	dichotomy.		
Furthermore,	whilst	 the	Commissioner	undeniably	 adopted	a	much	more	 inclusive	 language,	
the	underlying	rhetoric	concerning	LGBT	identities	and	rights	retained	 ‘homonormative’	undertones.	
In	general,	his	work	built	on	the	concept	of	the	presumed	universal	character	of	human	rights	and	the	
idea	of	‘sameness’	for	LGBT	persons	(Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	of	the	Council	of	Europe	2011,	
35).	 The	 work	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 did	 not	 engage	 at	 any	 point	 with	 forms	 of	 ‘raunchy	 sexuality’,	
defined	 by	 Ashford	 (2011)	 as	 ‘erotic	 challenges’	 to	 the	 law,	 in	 direct	 opposition	 to	 ‘a	 juridical	
homonormative	 discourse’.	 Because	 of	 his	 peculiar	 role	 as	mediator	 between	 civil	 society,	 national	
authorities	 and	 the	 CoE,	 the	 Commissioner	 enacted	 strategies	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 the	 persuasive	
character	of	his	actions	or	statements.	Implicitly,	therefore,	the	work	of	the	Commissioner	consists	of	
an	effort	to	demonstrate	the	 ‘sameness’	of	LGBT	persons	by	contributing	to	construct	them	as	being	
normal.		
At	a	glance,	 the	difference	between	the	(juridical)	 language	of	the	ECtHR	and	the	 language	of	
the	Commissioner	in	defining	LGBT	identities	and	plaintiffs	seems	to	have	a	twofold	motivation.	On	the	
one	 hand,	 there	 is	 the	 necessity	 for	 juridical	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 ECtHR,	 of	 embracing	 legal	
positivism	 in	order	to	achieve	objectivity,	predictability	and	impartiality	 in	the	adjudication	of	cases.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 the	 law	 is	 socially	 situated,	 and	 promotes	
‘hegemonic’	 understanding	 of	 (sexed	 and	 gendered)	 identities.	 Whilst	 the	 language	 of	 the	 ECtHR	
cannot	be	directly	permeated	by	 external	 intervention	 (i.e.	 from	 the	part	of	 the	Commissioner),	 it	 is	
nonetheless	 necessary	 to	 foster	 a	 much	 more	 sociologically-informed	 analysis	 of	 social,	 political,	
personal	 circumstances	 of	 applicants,	 also	 in	 light	 of	 ECtHR	 judges	 personal	 ‘activist’	 orientations	
(Voeten	2007).	
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Better Human Rights Protection through Better Language? An Agenda for Future Developments  
 
 From	 a	 sociological	 perspective,	 O’Byrne	 (2012,	 835)	 has	 emphasised	 the	 configuration	 of	
human	rights	as	‘language-structure’,	that	is	a	‘language	employed	to	describe	a	particular	set	of	social	
relationships’.	In	O’Byrne’s	opinion	(2012,	85)	this	implies	that	this	‘language’	is	malleable	enough	as	
to	 allow	 the	 attribution	 of	 (different)	 meaning(s)	 by	 distinct	 groups	 of	 individuals	 with	 diverging	
interests.	If	one	acknowledges	the	need	of	interpreting	the		ECHR	as	a	‘living	instrument,	which	must	
be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 light	 of	 present-day	 conditions’	 (Tyrer	 v.	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 para.	 4),	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 suggest	 that	 human	 rights	 language	 should	 also	 reflect	more	 closely	 the	 experiences	 of	
plaintiffs.	This	would	allow	to	and	break	away	from	essentialist	depictions	of	individuals	flattening	and	
reducing	 their	 juridical	 status	 as	 rights	 holders.	 The	 linguistic	 aspect	 of	 human	 rights	 appears	 ever	
more	important	if	one	acknowledges	that	LGBT	identities	and	issues	are	multifarious,	multidirectional	
and	often	intersecting	with	other	individual	characteristics.	
	 The	 language	 used	 to	 describe	 gender,	 sexuality	 and	 gender	 identity	 has	 been	 the	 object	 of	
Queer	 Linguistics	 (Motschenbacher	 2010)	 and	 there	 are	 discussions	 on	 the	 ‘linguistic	 reclamation’	
(Brontsema	 2004)	 of	 formerly	 derogatory	 terms	 used	 to	 address	 LGBT	 persons.	 More	 broadly,	 the	
question	of	the	choice	of	 terminology	appears	prominent	(and	often	contested)	 in	the	work	of	LGBT	
activists	 (Gamson	1995).	Because	of	 the	central	 role	 of	 language	 and	 linguistic	 performances	 in	 the	
description	 and	 articulation	 of	 LGBT	 identities,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 interrogate	 the	 limits	 of	 legal	
positivism	 in	 acknowledging	 the	 nexus	 between	 (sexual	 and/or	 gender)	behaviour	 and	 identity.	 Far	
from	suggesting	that	a	legal	positivist	approach	to	LGBT	rights	in	relation	to	the	work	of	the	ECtHR	is	
redundant,	 this	 analysis	 has	 brought	 to	 the	 forefront	 the	 triangular	 relationship	 between	 language,	
power	relations	and	the	law	from	a	Foucauldian	perspective.	The	analysis	of	the	case	law	has	shown	a	
tendency	 by	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘homonormative’	 narratives	 relating	 to	 homosexuality.	 The	
combined	 focus	 on	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 has	 hinted	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	 outside	 the	 field	 of	
juridical	 language,	more	 flexibility	 in	 linguistic	 expressions	on	LGBT	 identities	 can	be	expressed	but	
that	the	underlying	rhetoric	of	‘essentialisation’	and	‘normalisation’	of	LGBT	persons	is	still	prevalent.		
	 Ultimately,	 the	 promises	 of	 Queer	 Legal	 Theory	 of	 ‘queering	 the	 law’	 appear	 incapable	 of	
endowing	human	rights	scholarship	with	that	subversive	sense	of	‘indeterminacy’.	This	incongruence	
between	 the	 revolutionary	potential	 of	 queer	 theoretical	engagements	with	 the	 liberal	 positivism	of	
human	rights	law	does	not	exclude,	however,	that	in	the	future	the	ECtHR	can	pay	more	attention	to	the	
language	 employed	 in	 the	 judgments.	 Furthermore,	 the	 ECtHR	would	 benefit	 from	 becoming	 more	
reflexive	 on	 its	 linguistic	 practices	 and	 the	 underlying	 sociological	 criteria	 employed	 to	 define	 and	
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relate	about	different	identitarian	positions,	both	within	and	beyond	the	spectrum	of	LGBT	identities	
and	queerness.	Ultimately,	the	enhanced	attention	to	linguistic	and	sociological	practices	of	the	ECtHR	
may	enhance	its	capacity	to	address	human	rights	violations	from	an	intersectional	perspective.		
 
                                                            
1
 A previous version of this article has previously been published in French in the Journal Genre, Sexualité et Société. 
2
 European Court of Human Rights, The Online Admissibility Checklist, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=applicants&c=#n1357809352012_pointer, accessed 31 October 2017.  
3
 The “I” is here included for “intersex persons” but does not appear when analysing the case law, as there are no 
relevant cases adjudicated on these issues by the ECtHR.  
4
 ILGA-Europe, A Factsheet on Strategic Litigation to promote LGBTI Rights in Europe, available at: http://ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/factsheet_ligation_www.pdf, accessed 27th April 2017. 
5
 Until its abolishment by Protocol 11 ECHR in 1998, the Commission (established in 1954) decided on the admissibility 
of applications before bringing them to the ECtHR (only established in 1959). After the entry into force of Protocol 11 
in 1998, an enlarged ECtHR started to carry out decisions on admissibility for received applications.  
6
 For more details on the limited applicability of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act to Northern Ireland, see Johnson (2016, 
30 and 77-82).  
7
 For a discussion of the concept of the invisibility of lesbian existence, see Adrienne Rich (1980). 
8
 In Modinos v. Cyprus (1993), the ECtHR noted that, following Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (1981), the Cypriot 
Attorney General had not instituted any prosecution for homosexual conduct that could be in breach of Article 8 ECHR. 
The legislation, as in the case of Northern Ireland, remained on the statute books. 
9
 Part of the infamous 'Operation Spanner' in the UK.  
10
 In the description of the ECtHR these consensual practices included various forms of maltreatment of genitalia, 
ritualistic beatings with bare hands or other instruments, as well as forms of branding that left no serious injuries to 
the participant (Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 1997: para. 8). 
11
 For the 1967 Sexual Offences Act, section 1(7), an act was not be considered private if more than two persons were 
taking part or were present. This only applied to ‘gross indecency’ committed by men. 
12
 The most notable examples, in this regard, are cases such as Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010), X. and Others v. 
Austria (2013), as well as Fretté v. France (2002) and E.B. v. France (2008). 
13
 This consists in the attempt within the military to enhance ‘sex talk’ so that the creation of a public dimension of 
homosexuality has as its direct effect that of confining this same aspect in the private sphere, therefore paradoxically 
denying it. 
14
 The judgements were issued on the same date (27 December 1999), and the ECtHR substantially replicates its 
arguments in both, except the specific circumstances of the cases submitted by the applicants. 
15
 See ECtHR, Case 104-55, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook I (1955-57), ECtHR, Case 167/56, X. v. Federal 
Republi of Germany, Yearbook I (1955-57), ECtHR, Case 530/59, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany,  Collection of 
Decisions, and ECtHR, Case 5935/72, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, D&R. 
16
 In this case, the ECtHR had conceded that it was necessary to go beyond the ‘biological criteria’ in the definition of 
the gender of the spouse, thus allowing transgender persons to marry someone of the opposite gender. 
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